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Abstract 
Since the late 1990s, the extension of the equality framework in the United 
Kingdom has been accompanied by the recognition of religion within that 
framework and new measures to address religious discrimination. This 
development has been contested, with many arguing that religion is substantively 
different to other discrimination grounds and that increased protection against 
religious discrimination may undermine equality for other marginalized groups – 
in particular, women and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people. 
This paper considers these concerns from the perspective of minoritized women 
in the UK. It analyses two theoretical approaches to reconciling religious claims 
with gender equality – one based on privileging, the other based on challenging 
religious claims – before considering which, if either, reflects experiences in the 
UK in recent years and what this means for gender equality. 
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Religion and promoting gender equality 
This paper begins by considering why religion is problematic for those 
wishing to promote equality, in particular gender equality.1 It goes on to 
consider two theoretical models for reconciling religious and gender 
equality claims, before considering the viability of these models in the 
context of developments in UK policy and legislation between 1997 and 
2011.2 It concludes by discussing the implications for women discriminated 
against on the basis of both gender and minority religious status, and for 
gender equality more widely.3 
 One way in which religion may differ from other protected 
discrimination grounds (such as gender, disability or ethnicity) is that faith 
is a chosen rather than an inherent part of a person’s identity.4 It has been 
argued that religion, in contrast to these other grounds, corresponds to a 
political affiliation rather than an immutable element of one’s identity.5 
Whether or not this is true, it does not follow that religious discrimination 
should not be recognized and addressed. Nasar Meer points out the flaw in 
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary identities using the 
example of a Jewish person who could ‘pass’ for being non-Jewish but 
could not reasonably be asked to do so. Meer goes on to say: ‘[I]f we argue 
                                                     
1
 Although outside this paper’s remit, it is equally problematic from the perspective of   
LGBT equality. 
2
 Much of the paper relates to policy and legislation under the Labour governments of 
1997 to 2010. A Conservative and Liberal-Democrat coalition government was elected in 
May 2010.  
3
 The paper focuses on minority religious populations, in particular Muslim populations, 
because these have been the focus of much attention from policy makers and academics 
in the UK in the period covered. That is not to suggest that the tensions between gender 
and religious claims do not also exist in relation to Christianity. 
4
 In the UK, the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s remit covers seven 'protected 
groups' (age, disability, race or ethnicity, gender, transgender, religion or belief, and 
sexual orientation) as well as human rights. 
5
 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Extending the Public Sector Equality Duty to 
Religion or Belief – EHRC response, EHRC, 2009. 
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that people’s “difference” is less deserving of protection if it is in any way 
“changeable”, then we are advocating that those subject to discrimination 
or hostility should choose, where possible, to change their identity in order 
to avoid discrimination.’6 Even if this were reasonable, it would not solve 
the problem that while individuals may choose a religious or non-religious 
identity, they have no choice over the identity others ascribe to them. A 
Pakistani British woman’s experience of Islamophobia does not necessarily 
correlate to whether she defines herself as a Muslim. In this sense the 
voluntary/involuntary distinction is inoperable.  
 A second argument might be that religion is a private matter, that is, 
beyond the state’s remit. But the perception of religion as a private matter 
corresponds more to the way the majority religion – the Church of England 
– has traditionally been lived in Britain than to the way that minoritized 
individuals such as Muslim, Sikh and Jewish people experience their faith 
and demonstrate it through visible practices and dress.7 It could be argued 
that because of the centrality of Christianity in British history and tradition 
and the way it is expressed – if less strongly today – in daily life through 
Sunday opening hours, religious holidays and state institutions, requiring 
minorities to keep their religious identities private is in itself a form of 
religious discrimination.8 And if there is a general trend to deprivatize 
religion, this argument has less force.  
 Rather than concentrate on whether religion is distinct from the 
perspective of individual identity, we might consider whether religious 
claims and the organizations that make them are different to claims and 
organizations operating in other areas of discrimination. Religious claims 
are often seen to carry more weight than those made from a secular 
perspective because religion is understood as a matter of conscience and 
deep conviction. As Christian Joppke phrases it: ‘[O]ne has to consider that 
non-religious impositions are always less exacting on the individual – they 
                                                     
6
 N. Meer, ‘The Politics of Voluntary and Involuntary Identities: Are Muslims in Britain an 
Ethnic, Racial or Religious Minority?’ in Patterns of Prejudice, 42, 1 (2008), 77. 
7
 T. Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 2005, 123-4. Thanks to Yasmin Gunaratnam for the 
suggested usage of the term ‘minoritized’: ‘I use the term “minoritized” to give some 
sense of the active processes of racialization that are at work in designating certain 
attributes of groups in particular contexts as being in a “minority”’. Y. Gunaratnam, 
Researching 'Race' and Ethnicity: Methods, Knowledge and Power, London: Sage 
Publications 2003, 17. 
8
 A. Phillips, ‘Religion: Ally, Threat, or Just Religion?’ in J. Casanova and A. Phillips, A 
Debate on the Public Role of Religion and its Social and Gender Implications, Gender and 
Development Paper 5, Geneva: UNRISD (2009), 5-6.  
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don’t violate a script and ultimate commands to be kept, but challenge 
mere conventions or customs.’9 Or as Tariq Modood says: ‘“Because it is 
required/prohibited by my religion” has a special normative force that 
obliges us to accommodate it in the way we would not if someone said 
“because I want to.”’10 This is for many the reason why religious claims 
cannot simply be added to the equality spectrum: from a secular 
perspective, such claims cannot be challenged because religious 
organizations and individuals are using a different vocabulary, one that is 
not available to non-believers. The extent to which religious claims are off-
limits may be overstated.11 And one might distinguish between core tenets 
that are sacrosanct and the practices that stem from them which are not 
and which are open to interrogation by believers and non-believers alike. 
However, in public discourse in the UK, much of the debate about 
authentic interpretations of religious doctrine and what is permissible does 
not include non-religious perspectives but takes place between members 
of the religion in question – the disputation about the ordination of women 
priests in the Church of England for example. Where secular voices are 
heard, they tend to be hostile to religion per se rather than taking a 
position on what are judged to be the internal affairs of religion.12  
 The strength of conviction that religious claims are more exacting and 
less open to challenge than other claims is reflected in both international 
and national legislation, where religion is commonly recognized as a 
legitimate basis for exemption from universal equality measures. The 
European Employment Equality Directive, for example, permits member 
states to maintain national laws or practices allowing churches and other 
religious organizations to treat people differently on the basis of their 
religion or belief – stating that where this is a genuine occupational 
requirement according to that organization’s ethos, such differential 
treatment does not constitute discrimination. The Directive continues: 
 
Provided that its provisions are otherwise complied with, this Directive shall 
thus not prejudice the right of churches and other public or private 
organisations, the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, acting in 
                                                     
9
 C. Joppke, ‘The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy’ in 
British Journal of Sociology, 55:2 (2004), 241. 
10
  T. Modood, Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain, 181. 
11
  Phillips, ‘Religion: Ally, Threat, or Just Religion?’, 6. 
12
  Voices such as Richard Dawkins, author of The God Delusion (London: Bantam Press 
2006) and journalist Polly Toynbee, also President of the British Humanist Association. 
Toynbee’s articles include ‘Sex and death lie at the poisoned heart of religion’, in The 
Guardian, 14 September 2010. 
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conformity with national constitutions and laws, to require individuals 
working for them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organisation's 
ethos.13  
 
To give a practical example, this provision would allow churches to refuse 
to employ women priests.14 At national level, several European countries 
allow exemptions from equality legislation, including gender equality 
legislation, for religious organizations or on faith grounds.15   
 Implicitly or explicitly, such exemptions are based on the belief that 
having a religious identity and living in accordance with religious beliefs 
may prevent an employer, employee or service provider from complying 
with general equality norms. This accords with the interpretation of some 
religious organizations in the UK and relates to a further significant way in 
which religion is ‘different’ from other equality grounds: while 
organizations representing gender, disability, sexual orientation and race 
generally exist to confront discrimination, anti-discrimination work is a 
secondary activity for most organized religions, including those that have 
become equality ‘stakeholders’ in the UK.16 Indeed, some organized 
religions interpret their religious beliefs as incompatible with full equality 
for gender and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people.17 
Some are also organized in a hierarchical way with rules that breach equal 
opportunities practices for women and minorities that are generally 
accepted by other civil society organizations.18  
This is where the coincidence of recognizing religion as a 
discrimination ground while at the same time granting exemptions to 
                                                     
13 
 Available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:en:HTML, 
accessed 31 May 2011.  
14
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Handbook on European non-
discrimination law, 50. 
15
  See M. Dustin, Gender Equality, Cultural Diversity: European Comparisons and Lessons, 
London: LSE Gender Institute and Nuffield Foundation 2006, 14. Hege Skjeie discusses 
religious exemptions to equality in Norway. H. Skjeie, 'Religious Exemptions to 
Equality' in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 10:4 (2007), 
471-490. 
16
  Stakeholders is the term used to refer to the wide range of organizations with an 
interest or expertise in a particular area of public policy.  
17
  In January 2006, Sir Iqbal Sacranie, then head of the Muslim Council of Britain, told the 
Today Programme that civil partnerships were ‘harmful’ and homosexuality an 
‘unacceptable’ practice. His remarks were investigated by the Metropolitan Police but 
no charges were pressed.  
18
  B. Barry, Culture and Equality, Cambridge: Polity Press 2001, 156. 
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religious institutions that are not given to (or asked for by) other organized 
interests becomes a threat to gender equality. While equality law and 
regulations may be drawn up differently for different groups, the routine 
permission of exemptions applies uniquely to religion. And organized 
religion is unlike other discrimination lobbies in making claims for 
recognition of a religious identity and protection from religious 
discrimination that directly threaten progress towards equality for other 
groups. Women and LGBT people are most obviously at risk based on 
conservative or fundamentalist religious readings of what is permissible for 
women and in terms of sexual activity. But religious claims have presented 
an obstacle to equality for other groups: the UK’s former Disability Rights 
Commission was drawn into mediation on the question whether it is 
acceptable for Muslim restaurants and businesses to deny entry to guide 
dogs.19 
 One danger, then, is that demands for religious protection could 
undermine the rights of other marginalized groups, and that as religion 
becomes a recognized partner in the equality agenda, these demands are 
increasingly couched in the language of equality, freedom of speech and 
human rights. Rather than employ only scripture-based arguments, 
discrimination by religion can also be justified – paradoxically – using an 
anti-discrimination vocabulary. In parliamentary debates on the first 
Equality Bill in the UK in 2005, Earl Ferrers made the argument to the 
House of Lords that:  
 
[w]e have an Equality Bill saying that all these people [homosexuals and 
transsexuals] should be equal. However, as my noble friend said, people 
who have religious convictions often find that they are discriminated 
against if they do not want to take part in these [gay and lesbian] marriage 
ceremonies.20  
 
                                                     
19
  ‘No Ban On Guide Dogs Under Islamic Law’, Disability Rights Commission news release, 
11 December 2002. 
20
 Equality Bill [House of Lords] Committee Stage, 13 July 2005, available at 
www.Parliament.uk. 
  Akbar Warraich and Balchin identify ‘…a virtual monopoly *in Britain+ of the 
interpretation of Islam, Muslim laws and women’s rights within Islam by the extreme 
Right and conservative Right, the latter often masquerading as “moderates” having co-
opted the language of human rights’. S. Akbar Warraich and C. Balchin, Recognizing the 
Un-Recognized: Inter-Country Cases and Muslim Marriages and Divorces in Britain. A 
Policy Research by Women Living Under Muslim Laws, WLUML 2006, 64. 
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The more active and promotional way that equality has come to be 
understood in law and policy is a factor here: if equality is merely the 
absence of discrimination and discrimination law exists only to address 
abuses of rights on an individual basis, then extending the law to cover 
religious discrimination may be unproblematic. Most proponents of 
equality, however defined, would agree that if an individual is refused 
employment because s/he is a Muslim, then the law should intervene and 
provide redress. However, increasingly, achieving equality is seen to 
require more, and also encompasses recognition or affirmation of 
individual identity. Nancy Fraser has explored the decline in movements for 
egalitarian redistribution and rise in the ‘politics of recognition’.21 Fraser 
finds the politics of recognition problematic in encouraging ‘the reification 
of group identities’. She also points out that the identity model of 
recognition tends to ‘impose a single, drastically simplified group-identity 
which denies the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their 
identifications and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations.’22 This 
highlights a further problem with recognizing religious claims. If religion is 
conceptualized as a discrete, homogenous interest and lobby, ignoring the 
way religious concerns intersect with other aspects of individual identity 
and the way that is reflected in the forms discrimination takes – for 
example discrimination based on both gender and a minority religious 
identity – then including religion within the ‘politics of recognition’ is likely 
to be to the detriment of other disadvantaged or marginalized individuals.  
 The discussion above suggests that the question is less whether 
religion is different from other discrimination grounds, but rather whether 
claims based on religion are different from and compatible with other 
equality claims. I argue that it is the way that religious claims are 
recognized that is threatening to gender equality. The problem is the 
combination of recognizing religion as a discrete discrimination ground 
within a more promotional equality agenda, while at the same time 
allowing exemptions from general requirements to religious organizations 
on the basis that it is not reasonable to expect believers to renounce 
religious tenets even where these conflict with principles and laws that are 
widely upheld – such as equal access to employment for men and women.  
 If religion is substantively different to other discrimination grounds, 
one solution might be simply to exclude it from policy and all the 
accompanying processes, structures and funding streams. But not only is 
                                                     
21
  N. Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’ in New Left Review, 3, May/June 2000. 
22
  Ibid., 112. 
Dustin: Deference or Interrogation? 
16                                               Religion and Gender vol. 2, no. 1 (2012), 9-35 
this an unlikely change of policy direction in the UK, it would also be to 
abandon believers or members of religious organizations to the dictates of 
those organizations, however discriminatory. Moreover if, as will be 
identified in the section on UK developments below, there is evidence that 
religious minorities in the UK experience discrimination, disadvantage and 
harassment that cannot be attributed entirely to race or ethnicity, then 
most would agree that the government has a responsibility to intervene – 
with all that involves in terms of engagement with religious organizations. 
Both these factors give feminists a reason for exploring whether religious 
and gender-based equality are reconcilable, rather than simply refusing to 
recognize all religious claims, interests and partners. The following sections 
considers two possible and contrasting models of reconciliation. None of 
the writers discussed below is more or less committed to gender equality; 
where they differ is in their view of the role of the state in relation to 
organized religion and the extent to which the state is entitled to prohibit 
religious-based practices that conflict with generally upheld social 
principles. 
Reconciling gender and religion: privileging religious claims 
Martha Nussbaum has addressed the dilemma of recognizing religious 
claims without compromising gender equality in a number of works.23 For 
Nussbaum, the right to religious self-determination is not optional and 
something that can be easily discarded if it conflicts with gender equality. 
On the contrary, ‘*r+eligion is given a high degree of deference and 
protection in many constitutional conceptions, as it will be in mine.’24 
 Underpinning much of Nussbaum’s writing is the belief that 
individuals should be able to pursue their own conception of the good as 
                                                     
23
  The ideas outlined here are taken from several pieces of writing so should not be seen 
as representing a unified model by Nussbaum. The works are: M. C. Nussbaum, ‘A Plea 
for Difficulty’ in J. Cohen, M. Howard and M. C. Nussbaum (eds.) Is Multiculturalism 
Bad for Women? by Susan Moller Okin, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999; M. 
C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000; M. C. Nussbaum, ‘Rawls and Feminism’ 
in S. Freeman (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press 2003, 488-520.  
24
 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 190. 
Nussbaum’s ‘Capabilities Approach’ deserves more discussion than there is space for 
here but it claims that a better way of addressing poverty and development issues 
than in current models is through focusing on human capabilities – ‘what people are 
actually able to do and to be’ in a way that is ‘based on a principle of each person as 
end’ Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 5). 
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far as possible and that the state should facilitate and not impede them in 
doing so. Within that context, she argues: 
  
To be able to search for an understanding of the ultimate meaning of life in 
one’s own way is among the most important aspects of a life that is truly 
human. One of the ways which this has most frequently been done 
historically is through religious belief and practice.25  
 
Nussbaum suggests that liberals have not really acknowledged or 
understood the importance of religion because it is seen as ‘little more 
than a bag of superstitions’.26 She points to the good that can come out of 
a religious identity, using her own example as a Reform Jew. But Nussbaum 
also recognizes that women’s ability to exercise the full range of human 
capabilities is often limited in what she describes as ‘traditional religious 
cultures’.27 If religious self-determination is non-negotiable, the question 
then becomes how to determine the extent to which it is reasonable to 
constrain the free exercise of religion to ensure gender rights. Nussbaum 
uses John Rawls’ distinction between comprehensive and political 
liberalism.28 Under the former, liberal values such as autonomy ‘pervade 
the fabric of the body politic, determining not only the core of the political 
conception but many non-core social and political matters as well.’29 Under 
the latter, citizens are required to endorse the core values – such as the 
equality of all citizens – as political values only. Nussbaum’s preferred 
framework of political liberalism is based on the ‘fact of reasonable 
disagreement in society, and the existence of a reasonable plurality of 
comprehensive doctrines about the good, prominent among which are the 
religious conceptions.’30 This means that citizens, including religious 
believers, must accept the political equality of women as citizens but do 
not have to accept that men and women are equal as a ‘comprehensive 
moral value’. In contrast, comprehensive liberalism would require citizens 
to accept values such as gender equality in all areas of society including 
voluntary associations (and she includes religious organizations in this 
category). Nussbaum finds political liberalism preferable to comprehensive 
                                                     
25
  Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 179. 
26
  Nussbaum, ‘A Plea for Difficulty’, 105. 
27
  Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 188. 
28
  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press 1993. 
29
  Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty’, 109. 
30
  Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty’, 109. 
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liberalism in showing greater respect for citizens’ reasonable 
comprehensive views.  
 As a guiding principle, Nussbaum suggests the United States Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993: 
 
This act prohibits any agency, department or official of the United States, or 
of any state, from ‘substantially burden*ing+ a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability’, unless the 
government can demonstrate that this burden ‘(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.’31 
 
Guided by this model, Nussbaum supports laws of general applicability 
over religious claims in several cases. But she concludes that ‘as long as the 
freedom of individuals to change their religion is also firmly established’, 
the state should not dictate the internal practices of a religious body. To 
provide a concrete example, the Roman Catholic Church should not be 
compelled to hire women priests, which is a religious function, though it 
probably should be compelled to employ female janitors on the same basis 
as men.32  
 Nussbaum stresses on several occasions the need for any adequate 
approach to such dilemmas to recognize the diversity of views and 
evolution over time that exists within all religious traditions. In discussing 
the case of Shah Bano, which led to the Muslim Women’s Bill in India, she 
points out that one of the main problems was the Indian government’s 
failure to listen to the range of Muslim (and other) opinions on the case, 
instead ‘according legitimacy to a small group of established patriarchal 
clerics as the true representatives of the community…’33 This might suggest 
that conflicts between religious and gender equality claims can sometimes 
be resolved by opening up the debate to a range of opinions, including 
dissenting opinions within the religious institution in question and giving 
                                                     
31
  Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 198-199. 
32
  Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 228. 
33
  Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 226. In 1978 
Shah Bano, an elderly Muslim woman living in Madhya Pradesh, was made destitute 
when her husband divorced her and applied for maintenance under the uniform 
Criminal Procedure Code. The case led to much public debate on Muslim personal law 
and the need for a uniform civil code, and was exploited by Hindu fundamentalist 
groups. It culminated in 1986 when the Indian government passed the Muslim 
Women’s (Protection after Divorce) Act, denying all Muslim women the maintenance 
rights other Indian women were entitled to under the Criminal Procedure Code.  
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legitimacy to dissenting opinions. However, Nussbaum does not pursue this 
as her main strategy. Yet if gender equality is categorized as a ‘compelling 
government interest’ – as it must be for states that are signatories to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), European directives on gender equality and the many 
other international instruments affirming the principles of gender equality 
– surely the state should recognize a gender-friendly over a gender-
discriminatory interpretation of religious principles. 
 Instead of plurality of debate, however, Nussbaum prioritizes 
individual rights of exit as a safeguard for women. But exit only works if 
individuals view their religious identity as similar to membership of a 
voluntary organization. Nussbaum’s experience may have been one of 
choosing the most progressive of the variety of interpretations of Judaism 
on offer, but that is not the experience of many women. The overreliance 
on exit and its limitations have been recognized, in particular in relation to 
forced marriage.34 When the organization in question contains your family, 
friends and all those who provide support in the context of a sometimes 
hostile or racist environment, the factors are weighted against exit as a 
realistic solution.  
 Moreover, the most pernicious forms of religious discrimination can 
produce internalized norms of subordination that invalidate exit as a 
solution. Cass Sunstein, considering how governments should respond to 
discriminatory behaviour by religious institutions, argues that: 
 
The remedy of ‘exit’ – the right of women to leave a religious order – is 
crucial, but it will not be sufficient when girls have been taught in such a 
way as to be unable to scrutinize the practices with which they have grown 
up. People’s ‘preferences’ – itself an ambiguous term – need not be 
respected when they are adaptive to unjust background conditions; in such 
circumstances it is not even clear whether the relevant preferences are 
authentically ‘theirs’.35 
 
Sunstein highlights a further problem with Nussbaum’s position: that the 
choice of individual women to subordinate themselves perpetuates norms 
that may have a detrimental impact on all women. This suggests that, even 
                                                     
34
  A. Phillips and M. Dustin, ‘UK Initiatives on Forced Marriage: Regulation, Dialogue and 
Exit' in Political Studies, 52 (October 2004), 531-551. See also Skjeie, 'Religious 
Exemptions to Equality', 477. 
35
  C. Sunstein, ‘Should Sex Equality Law Apply to Religious Institutions?’ in J. Cohen, M. 
Howard and M. C. Nussbaum (eds.) Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? by Susan 
Moller Okin, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1999, 88. 
Dustin: Deference or Interrogation? 
20                                               Religion and Gender vol. 2, no. 1 (2012), 9-35 
if it were acceptable to give individual women the stark choice between 
gender equality outside their religion or oppression within it, the legitimacy 
this gives to discriminatory practices is unacceptable.  
 A related argument is that a non-interventionist, seemingly neutral 
position often reinforces existing power imbalances. Sunstein’s point that 
individual cases reinforce wider discriminatory norms suggests that in 
allowing gender discrimination on religious grounds the state is not a 
neutral protector of religious freedoms but is actively promoting women’s 
inequality. Or as Hege Skjeie phrases it: ‘When the state grants general 
exemption rights from anti-discrimination legislation to religious 
communities, it has unilaterally sided with the “majorities within”, and 
formally imposed on gender equality a duty to yield.’36 One might also 
reasonably ask why respect for individual freedom – in this case religious 
freedom – is generally at the expense of women. If a church claimed that it 
needed to exclude black people as candidates for priesthood in order to 
protect its religious identity, this would no longer be seen as reasonable.37 
 How could what Nussbaum calls the ‘religious dilemma’ be resolved 
in a way that respects self-determination on religious grounds without 
allowing gender inequality to persist outside of the political arena? One 
way is by rejecting simplistic conceptions of religion and gender that 
position them as necessarily in opposition. Nussbaum recognizes the 
plurality of voices within any organized religion, but fails to take the further 
step of recognizing the state’s right to challenge claims made by religious 
authorities about the fundamental tenets of their religion and related 
practices – claims that often rely on an unvarying, non-negotiable, 
patriarchal interpretation of religious orthodoxy.  
Reconciling gender and religion: challenging religious claims 
A contrasting position is provided by theorists who are willing to engage 
with religious arguments but on the basis that they are open to 
interrogation. There are now many writers challenging monolithic 
interpretations of Islam and Muslim identity.38 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, for 
                                                     
36
  Skjeie, 'Religious Exemptions to Equality', 488.  
37
  As Nussbaum herself notes: ‘It is characteristic of many modern debates that racial 
discrimination is taken to be an impermissible expression of religious tradition, while 
sex discrimination is taken to be just the way things have always been.’ Nussbaum, 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 229. 
38
  For example M. Sunder, ‘Piercing the Veil’ in Yale Law Journal, 112 (2003), 1399-1472; 
Z. Mir-Hosseini, ‘The Quest for Gender Justice: Emerging feminist voices in Islam’ in 
Women Living Under Muslim Laws Dossier 26, WLUML, 2004; L. Ahmed, Women and 
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example, argues that by ignoring the context within which Islamic texts 
emerged as well as the existence of alternative texts, secular 
fundamentalists are as guilty as Muslim traditionalists of ‘essentializing and 
perpetuating difference, reproducing a crude version of the Orientalist 
narrative of Islam.’39 Janet Afary has written of women’s attempts to 
reinterpret the Qur’an in a feminist light, stating that they ‘may not seem 
radically egalitarian from a secular feminist perspective’, but they have an 
impact and ‘have opened a breach in conservative ideology at a time when 
there was anyway popular dissatisfaction with the heavy-handed 
patriarchy of the Islamist regime.’40 
 The argument that a strongly secular position might undermine 
rather than empower Muslim women is fully developed by Madhavi Sunder 
in ‘Piercing the Veil’.41 Sunder argues that international law, premised on 
Enlightenment ideas of freedom, constructed religion as ‘inherently 
personal, uncontestable, homogeneous, and communal.’42 Law and religion 
then coexist but only on the basis that they are separate spheres, with law 
dominant in the public realm and religion in the private. The democratic 
principles that govern public life are not applied to the private realms of 
culture, religion and community, where the claims of ‘fundamentalist or 
traditional leaders’ are consistently upheld, ignoring the larger plurality of 
voices. Religion has therefore been allowed to develop as a sphere without 
rights. By failing to acknowledge the views of religious ‘dissenters’, law has 
given women no option but exit if they want to claim their rights. Sunder 
gives illustrations in support of her argument: the admirable goals of the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
for protecting women in the private sphere have been foiled by state 
reservations – or exemptions – from the Convention in areas where 
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CEDAW obligations conflict with state religious or customary law. But as 
Sunder points out, deferring to religious leaders’ arguments for 
reservations fails to recognize women dissenters within religious 
communities who oppose their country’s reservations and the religious 
interpretations on which they are based:  
 
These women argue that their governments – and the international human 
rights community have improperly deferred to traditionalists and so-called 
cultural leaders’ interpretations of private laws without taking proper 
account of modernizing views.43 
 
Sunder demonstrates the harmful impact for women of either a non-
interventionist approach, in which exit is the only option for minorities 
within minorities, or a model of state intervention based on a 
public/private distinction that ignores discrimination outside the public 
domain. She argues that this is no longer acceptable: 
 
Individuals in the modern world increasingly demand change within their 
religious communities in order to bring their faith in line with democratic 
norms and practices. Call this the New Enlightenment: Today, individuals 
seek reason, equality and liberty not just in the public sphere, but also in 
the private spheres of religion, culture, and family.44  
 
Like Mir-Hosseini, Sunder argues that there is a third way beyond the 
religion or rights dichotomy based on conceiving religion as ‘an ever-
shifting, subjective construct’.45 This empowers women to ‘reconstruct 
religious and cultural norms in ways that reflect modern, international 
human rights principles and women’s own current needs and 
aspirations.’46 It is not enough for the state to provide the right to exit or 
guarantee freedom in the public sphere only. Legal decision-makers need 
to recognize the ‘dynamism’ of religious communities and cease ‘privileging 
the norms of religious elites’.47 In practice, this should mean that when a 
specific dispute is brought before decision-makers, elites and dissenters 
should be placed on an equal footing. This approach – which Sunder calls 
‘passive proceduralism’ – would replace traditional legal understandings of 
religious rights that affirm the right of religious leaders to impose their 
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views on members. Sunder recognizes that this assumes women and other 
disempowered groups have the capacity to challenge religious leaders, 
which is not always the case. To address this she also proposes a ‘robust 
proceduralism’ on the part of the state in promoting discourse and giving 
women the educational and economic tools they need to challenge 
accepted norms.48  
 We might also look to Nancy Fraser’s alternative model of 
recognition here. Although not addressing the particular question of 
religious claims, Fraser suggests focusing on promoting parity of 
participation ‘to establish the subordinated party as a full partner in social 
life, able to interact with others as a peer.’49 She argues that ‘by 
establishing participatory parity as a normative standard, the status model 
submits claims for recognition to democratic processes of public 
justification, thus avoiding the authoritarian monologism of the politics of 
authenticity and valorizing transcultural interaction, as opposed to 
separatism and group enclaves’.50 Applied to the questions under 
discussion here, this could mean empowering dissenting voices within 
religious institutions to challenge the interpretations of religious doctrine 
that deny them their rights. 
 In contrast to models that defer to or privilege religious claims, the 
approach put forward here is based on a willingness to challenge religion in 
all areas of life. A position of unquestioning respect for religion leads to a 
ready acceptance of established and conservative views as to what religion 
is and what it requires. Sunder starts from a different perspective: women 
should not be required to choose between their beliefs and their rights and 
secular individuals and states should not collude in that false dichotomy 
but recognize the scope for discussing and contesting religious claims from 
within. This position recognizes the importance of religion to individual 
self-determination but sees religious interpretations and claims as open to 
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Developments in the UK after 1997  
How does any of the above map on to experiences in the UK? Do either of 
these approaches correspond to experiences in the UK, and what have 
been the implications for minoritized women?  
Britain is usually identified as a secular state that makes some 
concessions to the established religion, the Church of England. These 
include the position of the monarch as head of both state and the Church 
of England, and a requirement for daily worship of a broadly Christian 
nature in schools.51 In civil society, religious organizations have played a 
role in addressing disadvantage and providing welfare for many years but 
with little formal recognition or public debate about their role.52 However, 
in the period after 1997, religious organizations took a more visible role in 
policymaking, and the equality legislation and institutional framework 
encompassed religion in a new way – reflecting what has been identified as 
the global trend of the ‘deprivatization’ of religion.53   
 At the same time, events contributed to a new or renewed 
preoccupation with minority religious identities, specifically Muslim 
identities and Islam.54 And since the 2001 Census first included a question 
on religious identity, it became possible to separate British Asians into 
categories including Muslim, Sikh and Hindu, and demonstrate that in a 
range of areas – health, education, employment and housing – Muslims 
experience greater disadvantage than members of other minority 
religions.55 And while ‘multiculturalism’ became a term with largely 
negative connotations, the Labour government addressed minority 
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religious identities and concerns to an unprecedented degree, embracing 
the concept of ‘multifaith engagement’.56   
 This is not to suggest that concerns arising from the more public role 
of religion in the UK relate only to religious minorities. However, this 
paper’s particular concern is with the impact on minoritized women of the 
changing relationship between the state and organized religion. While it 
identifies policy trends and legislation relating to religion in general, it 
focuses on the way that the government engaged with minority religious 
interests and organizations and the impact for women.  
 One way in which the state embraced religion was through explicit 
support for religious schools and state funding for them. Prime Minister 
Tony Blair made it clear that he viewed religious schools as a positive 
feature of the education system.57 When the Labour government was 
formed in 1997, only Christian and a small number of Jewish schools 
received state funding, but after 1997 the number of state-funded schools 
for minority religions increased, partly in recognition of the need for a 
more balanced treatment of majority and minority religions.58  
 Support for faith schools often appeared to conflict with the rejection 
of multiculturalism mentioned above. The government-commissioned 
Cantle Report into the ‘riots’ of 200159 suggested that segregated 
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communities were undermining social cohesion and expressed concern 
‘that some existing faith schools appear to be operating discriminatory 
policies where religious affiliations protect cultural and ethnic divisions’.60 
The report was highly influential, but its concerns about faith schools were 
not acted upon. In the following period, the introduction and expansion of 
new types of state schools with greater freedom from local authority 
control, such as academies, heightened concerns about both an increase in 
the number of faith schools and the extent to which such schools are able 
to avoid regulation and may discriminate in their employment and 
admissions policies.61 
 During the same period, government policy documents were 
increasingly recognizing religious identities through the concept of ‘faith 
communities’. A Faith Communities Unit was established in the Home 
Office in 2003, alongside units working on race and community cohesion, 
‘to lead on Government engagement with faith communities.’62 
Recommendations made in 2004 for cooperation between government 
and faith communities suggested that government departments should 
‘*p+ursue “faith literacy” and participate in internal faith awareness 
training.’63 In 2008, a new ‘framework for partnership in our multifaith 
society’ identified the building blocks for ‘effective dialogue and social 
action involving people with different faiths and beliefs and those with 
none.’64 The Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund was established to 
strengthen the capacity of faith organizations, distributing more than 
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eleven million pounds to more than nine hundred single and interfaith 
organizations over a two-year period.65 
 In these initiatives the boundaries between religious and ethnic 
minorities often appeared blurred with religion becoming a proxy for race 
or ethnicity: for example, the 2005 strategy to increase race equality and 
community cohesion promised funding for faith communities and 
protection against religious discrimination.66 Faith-based organizations 
were seen as a channel for the government to engage with BME 
communities, perhaps encouraging minorities organizing at local level to 
do so on the basis of religious rather than ethnic identity to improve their 
chances of securing public funding.67 
 Religious interests were incorporated in government-led working 
groups and consultation processes in a new way. In 2004, a new inter-
departmental official committee was announced to ‘provide a vehicle for 
the exchange of good practice on matters relating to faith and other ethical 
belief systems and of information about the Government’s discussions and 
consultations with faith communities.’68 The Government Equalities Office 
(GEO)’s Senior Stakeholder Group was established to ‘provide advice to the 
GEO and its Ministers on how to further strengthen equality protection and 
to streamline the law.’ In 2011, the Group’s membership included 
representatives of the Catholic Bishops' Conference of England and Wales 
and the Religion and Belief Consultative Group.69  
 Of particular concern was the increase in public commissioning of 
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religious organizations to deliver public services. In 2008, the government 
announced its intention to ‘remove the barriers to commissioning services 
from faith-based groups.’70 This was opposed by humanist, secularist and 
women’s organizations based on the risk that religious organizations would 
discriminate against employees, potential employees and service users.71 
However, the contracting out of public services to organizations, including 
religious organizations, appeared likely to intensify under the new coalition 
government elected in May 2010, as it relies on the voluntary sector to 
deliver the Big Society at the heart of its manifesto in the context of drastic 
public sector cuts.72 In 2011, the government awarded the Salvation Army, 
a faith-based organization, a large contract for providing support to 
trafficking victims in place of a women’s organization specializing in 
services to victims of sex trafficking.73  
Turning to legislation, the European Employment Directive in 2000 
led to the inclusion of religion alongside other grounds for discrimination, 
and required EU member states to introduce anti-discriminatory 
employment legislation in these areas. In the UK, regulations were 
introduced in 2003, preventing discrimination in employment on the 
grounds of religion or belief (and sexual orientation).74 The 2006 Equality 
Act extended protection against discrimination on religious grounds and 
established the Equality and Human Rights Commission, responsible for all 
areas of equality – including religion or belief – and human rights. The 
Racial and Religious Hatred Act, also passed in 2006, created a new offence 
of incitement to religious hatred to parallel provisions on incitement to 
racial hatred. In 2010, a second Equality Act was passed, including a new 
single equality duty on public bodies – replacing earlier gender, race and 
disability duties and also covering age, sexual orientation, religion or belief, 
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pregnancy and maternity, and gender reassignment.75 The duty reflected 
the more complex understanding of equality mentioned above in requiring 
public bodies to have ‘due regard’ not only to the need to eliminate 
discrimination, but also to advance equality of opportunity and foster good 
relations between different groups. It was the second and third ‘arms’ of 
the duty that caused concern on the part of those who saw a threat from 
organized religion – fearing it would lead to the promotion of religion – 
including discriminatory interpretations of religion.76  
 The Equality Act 2010 contained the same exemptions for organized 
religion that were contained in earlier legislation.77 These raised fears that 
religious organizations would use such exemptions to discriminate against 
employees and service providers, or that individuals would use them to 
discriminate against other individuals. Following the introduction of the 
2003 regulations, a number of employment discrimination cases involving 
religion came to court, including that of a local authority registrar unwilling 
to perform civil partnership ceremonies on the basis of her religious 
convictions.78 In this case, the court of appeal found that religious belief did 
not exclude the registrar from performing her civil partnership duties, 
perhaps supporting the government’s argument that the religious 
exemptions had been drawn sufficiently tightly, applying only to a small 
number of posts that exist to promote and represent religion. Much in line 
with Nussbaum’s position, the Equality Act’s explanatory notes give the 
following examples of how exemptions should apply: 
 
This exception is unlikely to permit a requirement that a church youth 
worker who primarily organises sporting activities is celibate if he is gay, 
but it may apply if the youth worker mainly teaches Bible classes. This 
exception would not apply to a requirement that a church accountant be 
celibate if he is gay.79 
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This corresponds with Nussbaum’s argument that the state should defend 
its ‘compelling interests’ (in this case preventing discrimination), while at 
the same time showing respect for religion by allowing religious 
organizations to manage ‘practices internal to the conduct of the religious 
body itself.’80 Reconciliation of religious demands and equality is achieved 
by drawing a distinction between what is and is not a fundamental 
requirement of the religion in question. However, there is no consideration 
of whether the state has a role in questioning what are the fundamental 
requirements of religious institutions.  
 The government saw the narrowness of the exemptions in the 
legislation as sufficient safeguard against discrimination by religious 
organizations. However, the less visible effects of the developments 
identified above are a concern. Without recognition of the diversity of 
religious views, the claims made on religious grounds may go unchallenged 
and be taken as universally accepted orthodoxy. For example, the Muslim 
Council of Britain’s guidance for schools states that ‘*i+n public … girls 
should be covered except for their hands and faces, a concept known as 
“hijab”’ – failing to recognize the perspectives of the many Muslim parents 
who choose not to dress their daughters in this way. It also says that 
‘girlfriend/boyfriend as well as homosexual relationships are not 
acceptable practices according to Islamic teachings’ and advises against 
mixed gender sex education that ‘compromises *children’s+ sense of 
modesty and decency.’81 
 This is not official guidance and it is unclear how widely the 
publication was disseminated in schools. However it suggests that the less 
tangible attitudes and behaviours promulgated as religious orthodoxy may 
be at least as problematic from liberal, human rights or feminist 
perspectives as the ‘practices’ that have been associated with minority 
religions – forced marriage and ‘honour’ based violence – but are rarely 
defended by religious authorities in the UK. Expectations of modesty, the 
requirement of obedience to patriarchal authority, restrictions on female 
education and employment – all of these exist throughout society, and 
religious discrimination is often reflected in or reflects discriminatory 
attitudes that are widespread among religious and non-religious 
communities. The point is that discrimination may be more difficult for girls 
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(and women) to challenge or overcome when identified with religious 
authority. 
 The problem here is not necessarily religion, however defined, so 
much as the choice of religious representatives and the organizations that 
the government recognizes as stakeholders. For many years, the Muslim 
Council of Britain was the main or only Muslim representative in 
government working groups and committees.82 There were efforts to 
engage with young Muslims and Muslim women – in recognition that the 
Muslim community was too often represented only by its ‘traditional’ 
leaders. The Muslim Women’s Network was set up in 2002 by the then 
Minister for Women Patricia Hewitt with the support of the Women’s 
National Commission. In 2006, the Network published She Who Disputes – 
Muslim Women Shape the Debate, a report based on the views of more 
than two hundred women on a range of issues. As might be anticipated 
from Sunder’s analysis of religious dissent, the interviewees ‘were keen to 
explain that the Islam that they embraced was distinct and different from 
the artificially stark, gendered religion envisaged by protagonists on both 
sides of the divide.’83 However, the way policy processes work means that 
minority religious views were represented by a few of the longer-
established and better-funded organizations. Unless the issue was a 
‘women’s issue’, women and women’s organizations were rarely invited to 
sit at the table.   
Conclusion 
This paper has identified a shift away from the tacit role of religion in public 
life in the UK towards its more formalized inclusion in policy and legislative 
processes. After 1997, religion became an organized lobby and permanent 
part of the political process for advancing equality alongside gender, race 
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and other equality interests. Religious claims, including those made by 
members of minority religions, were increasingly recognized alongside 
claims based on race, gender, disability, sexual orientation, transgender 
status and age. On the one hand, religion came to be treated on a par with 
other claims, as a logical extension of gender and race equality. On the 
other hand, there remained a highly deferential approach to religion: 
believers and non-believers appeared to accept that certain tenets of 
religion are so deeply held that they are not open to debate, certainly not 
by outsiders. There was little recognition that ‘far from being 
homogeneous and fixed, religion and culture are and ought to be plural, 
contested, and constantly evolving to meet the changing needs and 
demands of modern individuals.’84 The tendency by the government to 
homogenize religions failed to recognize the diversity of religious views and 
interests, in particular those of women and other marginalized individuals. 
Gender and religion were treated in isolation with an overly deferential 
attitude to the latter. As a result, women facing discrimination within 
religious communities had to choose, as Sunder puts it, between religion 
and their rights in relying on exit from those communities rather than 
public support in modifying them from within. 
 The way in which religion was deprivatized thus has more in common 
with the deferential approach than with the interrogatory model discussed 
in this paper. Religion was invited to join the equality debate and 
participate in wider political processes but on a privileged basis. Deference 
to religious claims was reflected in the exceptions for religion written into 
equality legislation. These assume that religious freedom requires religious 
institutions to be exempt from otherwise universally upheld standards of 
behaviour. As a result, views and practices that would be condemned in 
other civil society organizations are accommodated by the law in the case 
of religion. Rather than promoting equality by confronting sexist or 
homophobic practices by religious organizations, the state has accepted 
such views as integral to believers’ religious identity. Here one can see the 
distinction between political and comprehensive values reflected in the 
principle that there needs to be a ‘compelling interest’ for intervening in 
the internal affairs of religious organizations – with gender discrimination 
rarely seen as sufficiently compelling. Yet it is often unclear whether 
certain beliefs and practices are essential for the body of believers, or 
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rather serve the interests of the leadership of the more established 
religious organizations. As Sunder suggests, this allows ‘religious leaders 
[to] take advantage of a legal tradition that does not think critically about 
the internal political dimensions of religion and that presumes religion is 
imposed without internal contest or claims of right.’85 
 As an alternative, building on Sunder’s model would allow the 
possibility of recognizing religious identities without undermining gender 
equality. To take an example, when the Muslim Council of Britain is 
accepted as the representative voice of British Muslims, and its Secretary-
General says that civil partnerships are harmful and homosexuality an 
unacceptable practice, this will be interpreted as an authoritative 
statement of the Islamic position on the issue. However, if such a 
statement were used to spark an open debate engaging a range of Muslim 
and other voices – voices such as Safra, an organization by and for LBT 
Muslim women – then an alternative view of what an Islamic identity 
requires and allows might slowly begin to emerge.86  
 If we extend beyond the details of British policy and legislation to 
consider some of the hypothetical dilemmas presented as examples of the 
conflict between religion and gender, Sunder’s approach is again 
illuminating. Cass Sunstein lists some plausible dilemmas, including a 
Catholic university that refuses to agree tenure to women teachers and 
Jewish schools that refuse to admit girls.87 But these are only dilemmas 
because the discriminatory interpretation of Judaism and Catholicism is 
deferred to and accepted as the only legitimate interpretation of these 
faiths. If the Jewish families seeking access to the schools and the Catholic 
women seeking employment as teachers were recognized as having their 
own – legitimate – interpretations of the requirements of their faith, the 
situation shifts. Now there is a lobby within the religious lobby, demanding 
equality in a way that more closely conforms to the state’s general interest 
in equality and which could lead religious organizations to question 
whether discriminatory practices are part of their core doctrine or whether 
they may be ‘no more than the sedimentation of previous prejudice.’88 
 Such an approach would perform a service to those within religious 
communities or with religious beliefs whose views are not heard. Religions 
are often represented by the more conservative or fundamentalist voices, 
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with opposition coming from a similarly uncompromising secular lobby.89 
Recognition of the heterogeneity of religious communities could erode 
perceptions that Muslims and Catholics for example (and probably in 
particular) are universally or inevitably opposed to women’s and gay rights 
when the reality of individuals’ relationships with the dictates of religious 
authorities is more complicated.90 In allowing exemptions from equality 
legislation for the purposes of organized religion, the state misrepresents 
those who do not wish to use their religion as justification for 
discrimination. 
 I recognize that the discussion above inevitably oversimplifies the 
theoretical positions discussed for the purposes of my argument. Equally, I 
recognize that governments do not choose between polar positions such as 
privileging or challenging religious claims, that policies are made on the 
basis of the status quo in combination with a range of competing interests 
that have not been addressed here, and that progress is incremental and 
based on what is possible rather than on abstract models. Depending on 
extending engagement to minority religious organizations that are 
perceived to be more progressive may also be naïve – such organizations 
tend to be small and under-funded and lack the capacity for strategic 
engagement at national policy level.91 It is similarly naïve to assume that 
those who are discriminated against reject discrimination against others 
and that giving them a voice will instantly transform religious values. And 
simply giving a voice to gender-friendly perspectives within religion will not 
change outcomes unless those voices start to ‘win the argument’. Gender 
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equality is itself a contested concept and is understood very differently by 
different women. And some women freely choose to submit to what many 
feminists would view as patriarchal religious authority.92 Having said all 
that, it is still the case that the relationship between religion and public 
policy in the UK has developed through polarized debates, with religion too 
often represented by conservative and traditional voices, and with the 
opposing voices that are most often heard coming from a secular lobby 
that is hostile to any public role for religion.  
 If religions were monolithic, ahistorical and unchanging, it would 
indeed be difficult to include religious claims in a democratic system based 
on principles of equality and human rights. Then the only solutions to the 
‘religious dilemma’ would be to reject religion or confine it to the private 
sphere. But, as many writers and activists within religious communities are 
demonstrating, religion does not have to be conceived in this way. Women 
should not have to choose between their rights and their faith, and the 
state can support them by refusing to exempt religion from its core societal 
values, such as gender equality. By facilitating the inclusion of dissenting 
voices, the state therefore has a role to play in encouraging religious 
organizations to become more democratic and responsive to their 
members and to wider societal values as they change over time. Privileging 
religious claims without questioning them is harmful to women and girls 
within religious organizations and communities and undermines the 
government’s commitment to gender equality on every level. If religious 
claims are to be included and recognized within governmental equality 
frameworks, they need to be evaluated – and, where necessary, challenged 
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